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HARRY ASHMORE AND "THE CRISIS MR. FAUBUS MADE"
Elizabeth Jacoway*
Few people in Little Rock, or elsewhere for that matter, can explain
with any clarity or certainty what happened in that moderate, upper-South
city in September of 1957. Apart from the complexity of the legal and emo-
tional issues involved, two factors account for the ongoing failure to under-
stand the series of incidents remembered collectively as "The Little Rock
Crisis": one is the interpretation spun out by Arkansas Gazette editor Harry
Ashmore; the other is the investigation carried out (but never reported) by
the FBI. Taken together these two factors have obscured, from the very first
week of the crisis, the true nature of that historic occurrence.'
Two days after Governor Orval Faubus surrounded Little Rock Central
High School with the Arkansas National Guard, Harry Ashmore wrote an
editorial he titled "The Crisis Mr. Faubus Made," in which he laid the foun-
dation for an interpretation of the governor's actions that has made its way
into every high school textbook from that day to this.2 In that editorial,
Ashmore argued that despite Faubus's claims that he had acted to prevent
violence in Little Rock, no threat of violence actually existed. In the follow-
ing days Ashmore expanded his argument to encompass the claims that
Faubus's threats of violence actually encouraged the ensuing violence that
did occur and, more importantly, that Faubus pursued said course of action
out of a venal and opportunistic bid for political gain. On the same day that
Ashmore launched his editorial campaign against the governor, the discre-
dited lame-duck mayor of Little Rock, Woodrow Wilson Mann, inaugurated
a brief career as an Ashmore puppet when he announced to the press that
Faubus' claims of violence were a "hoax" that the governor was perpetrating
upon the people of Little Rock.3
In 1954 Harry Ashmore had written an extensive report for the Ford
Foundation titled The Negro and the Schools, ostensibly an examination of
* A native of Little Rock, Elizabeth Jacoway earned her Ph.D. at the University of
North Carolina, working under George Brown Tindall and Joel Williamson. She has taught at
the University of Florida, the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, and Lyon College. She is
the author or editor of six books and seventeen articles, most notably TURN AWAY THY SON:
LITTLE ROCK, THE CRISIS THAT SHOCKED THE NATION (2007).
1. Crisis in the South: The Little Rock Story, ARK. GAZETTE 1959; FED. BUREAU
INVESTIGATION, LITTLE ROCK CRISIS REPORTS [hereinafter FBI REPORT], Archives and Spe-
cial Collections, Ottenheimer Library, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
2. The Crisis Mr. Faubus Made, ARK. GAZETTE, Sept. 4, 1957, at 4A.
3. Mann Attacks Story of Fear of Violence, ARK. GAZETTE, Sept. 5, 1957, at IA.
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the state of African American education that southern officials could use in
adjusting to the dictates of the Brown decision.4 In 1956, Ashmore had
served on Adlai Stevenson's presidential campaign as a press secretary and
authority on southern affairs, a position in which he had developed many
contacts and friendships with the nation's press corps. When the crisis broke
in his city, Ashmore quickly became the "go-to" person for the visiting press
in Little Rock as a resident expert on race relations and a highly regarded
journalist with a national reputation. As a highly intelligent and unusually
charming man who spent part of every afternoon sipping martinis at the
Little Rock Club or the Press Club across the street from the Gazette build-
ing, Ashmore became a boon companion who easily shaped the national
media's understanding of what was happening in the unexpected and un-
precedented situation they were all struggling to explain to their readers.
Rarely has one journalist had such an opportunity to influence the nation's
understanding of itself.
Based on the claims of Ashmore and Mayor Mann, on September 4 vi-
siting federal judge Ronald Davies ordered an FBI investigation of the situa-
tion in Little Rock, clearly expecting to find that Faubus's actions amounted
to defiance of the federal court order demanding desegregation. The title of
the FBI Report reveals its underlying assumptions, "Integration in Public
Schools, Little Rock, Arkansas-Civil Rights; Contempt of Court."5 Had the
FBI's investigation yielded the expected findings, the federal government
undoubtedly would have overruled the governor, if not jailed him. The
FBI's investigation, however, did not produce the information the Justice
Department had anticipated. As a consequence, the Department suppressed
the report on the explicit instructions of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and
the world never learned the details of the crisis in Little Rock.6
Of the 450 interviews the FBI agents conducted between September 4
and September 14, 1957, eighty-seven revealed rumors or threats of vi-
olence. Assistant Attorney General Warren Olney, who lost his job a week
later, reported to Attorney General Herbert Brownell that the interviews
uncovered no evidence of the danger of violence. 7 Brownell had been ex-
4. HARRY S. ASHMORE, THE NEGRO AND THE SCHOOLS (1954).
5. FBI REPORT.
6. Director's Brief, Vol. 1, File 2, p. A-31, Box 1, Folder 2, FBI REPORT. Professor
Tony Freyer used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain a copy of the FBI Report, which
he later deposited in the Archives and Special Collections at the University of Arkansas at
Little Rock.
7. Warren Olney III to Herbert Brownell, September 13, 1957, "Summary of FBI re-
port in Little Rock, Arkansas integration difficulty," Box 5, Folder 2, Arthur Brann Caldwell
Papers, Special Collections, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. Olney Quits Department of
Justice, ARK. DEMOCRAT, Sept. 18, 1957, at Al. Olney's retirement went into effect on Octo-
ber 15, 1957; on October 3 he made a speech in California titled "A Government Lawyer
Looks at Little Rock," which historians often cite, but that speech also came under severe
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pecting for some time that "a clash of historic importance" would erupt
somewhere in the South as a result of the growing movement of massive
resistance to desegregation, and he felt it was essential to crush that defiant
spirit in order to demonstrate the superiority, and the resolve, of the federal
government.8 Brownell was therefore predisposed to view Orval Faubus's
actions as an expression of Massive Resistance, and he was determined to
demonstrate forcefully that the federal government would not tolerate such
defiance from the South's elected officials or its educational establishment.
In fact Orval Faubus was not acting in concert with the practitioners of
Massive Resistance. Instead, he worked purposefully to avoid falling into a
pattern of defying federal court orders. Furthermore, Little Rock was not the
racist, defiant community seemingly portrayed in the iconic photographs
that traveled around the globe in 1957. These troubling images lodged so
firmly in viewers' minds that even today, one can go anywhere in the world
and say one is from Little Rock, and the inevitable response will be, "I re-
member what happened in your city in 1957." What they remember is only a
part of the story, and probably not the most important part. So what did hap-
pen in Little Rock fifty years ago?
The week that the United States Supreme Court handed down Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas,9 in May of 1954, Little Rock school
Superintendent Virgil Blossom stepped forth and announced that his School
Board would comply voluntarily with the Court's new mandate.'0 Blossom
had implemented school desegregation in Fayetteville, Arkansas, and the
burly former football coach believed he could accomplish a similar feat in
Little Rock with little difficulty, thereby positioning himself for a run for the
governorship." A year later, in May of 1955, the Little Rock School Board
announced its adoption of a gradual, phased plan of desegregation, popular-
ly known, to the delight of the superintendent, as the Blossom Plan. Just a
week after this announcement, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
criticism within the Department of Justice for its misstatements of fact. Warren Olney III, "A
Government Lawyer Looks at Little Rock," October 3, 1957, Box 5, Folder 5, Caldwell Pa-
pers; Director's Brief, Vol. 1, File 2, p. A-36, Box 1, Folder 2, FBI REPORT.
8. HERBERT BROWNELL & JOHN P. BURKE, ADVISING IKE: THE MEMOIRS OF ATrORNEY
GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL 206 (1993). Assistant Attorney General Warren Olney III
explained in December of 1957 that the Justice Department reacted so forcefully to Faubus
because they thought he was engaging in nullification; Warren Olney III, "States Rights,
Federal Law and Little Rock," Box 5, Folder 5, Caldwell Papers.
9. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. VIRGIL T. BLOSSOM, IT HAS HAPPENED HERE (1959).
11. Nat R. Griswold, The Second Reconstruction in Little Rock (unpublished manu-
script on file with the author). Political scientist and student of the Little Rock crisis Irving
Spitzberg also heard from interviewees that Blossom aspired to the governor's chair. IRVING
SPITZBERG JR., RACIAL POLITICS I1N LITrLE ROCK, 1954-1964 56 (1987).
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in Brown _II,2 calling for "all deliberate speed" in proceeding with school
desegregation. The immediate, south-wide response to Brown II was a phe-
nomenon remembered as "The Rise of Massive Resistance," a movement of
southern officials and citizens' councils to interpose the authority of the
state between the power of the federal government and the nation's citize-
nry.
13
While Virgil Blossom went about the business of selling his plan to a
reluctant white community, the entire southern congressional delegation
(with three exceptions) signed the Southern Manifesto, a gentlemanly blast
of defiance against the legitimacy of the Brown decisions, in March of
1956.' 4 A few months later, Arkansas's liberal governor, Orval Eugene Fau-
bus, whose father had named him for the old socialist candidate for presi-
dent Eugene V. Debs, found himself facing a gifted orator and energetic
opponent, James D. Johnson, in a campaign to retain his seat in the state
house. Johnson's openly racist attacks on the incumbent governor pushed
Faubus far to the right in the summer of 1956, and by the end of the cam-
paign he promised from the stump that "[tihere will be no forced integration
of our public schools and institutions as long as I am governor."' 5 Faubus
won his race handily, but the campaign against a genuine practitioner of
Massive Resistance had demonstrated to him the power of the race issue. It
was a lesson he never forgot.
In the winter 1957 session of the Arkansas General Assembly, a power-
ful group of legislators from the Black Belt along the Mississippi River
pushed through a series of four bills, all of them calling for the maintenance
of segregation despite the Brown decisions. Faubus signed them into law,
although he understood the liability they represented for any governor who
was sworn to uphold the laws of the State of Arkansas. An intelligent and
realistic man, Faubus knew that no state law can supersede federal laws, but
he also knew that as a matter of political necessity he would have to see the
new laws declared unconstitutional so he could say to his constituents that
his hands were tied." In other words, he would have to have a delay of the
starting date of desegregation. He knew that in the absence of a delay, in just
12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
13. See NuMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN
THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S (1969).
14. Anthony J. Badger, The White Reaction to Brown: Arkansas, the Southern Manifes-
to, and Massive Resistance, in UNDERSTANDING THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: AN EXERCISE IN
REMEMBRANCE AND RECONCILIATION 94 (Elizabeth Jacoway & C. Fred Williams eds. 1999).
15. Governor Bares Knuckles to Copeland, 2 Main Foes, ARK. GAZETE, July 17, 1956.
16. BLOSSOM, supra note 10, at 36.
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a few short months this issue would be unavoidable in Little Rock. His ulc-
ers began to bother him. 7
On April 30 the Capital Citizens' Council fired the opening blast in
what proved to be an effective campaign to intimidate both Orval Faubus
and Virgil Blossom. Blanketing the city with 100,000 copies of a flyer that
asked Governor Faubus what he intended to do to stop integration in Little
Rock, the Council proceeded to run inflammatory newspaper ads and import
incendiary speakers at such a pace that both the School Board and the gov-
ernor's office felt under siege. 8 Blossom began to receive telephone threats
to his and his family's personal safety, and quite understandably, he pa-
nicked. 9 The School Board directed him to secure a pledge from Governor
Faubus that he would not tolerate threats to the peace of the community.
A savvy politician, Faubus was determined to remain above the fray.
He stressed repeatedly that he had always considered school desegregation a
local matter and that he did not intend to involve himself with such an in-
flammatory political issue.20 The more he resisted Blossom's entreaties for
assistance, the more Blossom pushed the governor to yield, eventually feed-
ing him enough stories of the dangers of impending violence that they
would curl the hair of any self-respecting politician. In the extensive give
and take of this ongoing exchange, Virgil Blossom at length developed an
understanding of Faubus's need for a delay.2 '
Enter Little Rock School Board member Wayne Upton. An across the
street neighbor and close confidante of Virgil Blossom, Upton was also an
attorney. On one of his routine trips to Fort Smith to try a case before Feder-
al Judge John Miller, Upton asked the judge a "hypothetical question." If, he
asked, someone were to bring a suit in state court seeking an injunction
against the Little Rock School Board calling for a delay of the start date of
17. Roy REED, FAUBUS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AN AMERICAN PRODIGAL 188 (1980);
ORVAL EUGENE FAUBUS, DOWN FROM THE HILLS 185 (1980); interview with Alta Faubus
(April 9, 1996) (on file with the author).
18. Robert Ewing Brown to Governor Orval E. Faubus, April 30, 1956, Box 4, Folder 3,
Virgil Blossom Papers, Special Collections, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville; Race Mix-
ing! in Little Rock, North Little Rock, Ft. Smith and All Arkansas Schools Can Be Stopped By
the Governor, ARK. DEMOCRAT, July 1, 1957, at 10; People of Arkansas vs. Race Mixing!,
ARK. DEMOCRAT, July 9, 1957; Virgil Blossom and Little Rock School Board. SPEAK UP SO
WE CAN HEAR YOU!, ARK. DEMOCRAT, July 15, 1957, at 16; William W. Hughes, Minister
Tells White Council Integration Is "Devil's Work, " ARK. GAZETTE, July 17, 1957, at 6A.
19. Interview by John Luter with R. A. Lile, (Aug. 19, 1971), Eisenhower Administra-
tion Project [hereinafter EAP], Columbia University Oral History Program, Dwight David
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; interview with R. A. Lile (Dec. 22, 1977); interview
by Roy Reed with Harold Engstrom, (Jan. 11, 1990), Roy Reed Papers, Special Collections,
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville; interview by John Pagan with Wayne Upton (Aug. 22,
1972) (on file with the author).
20. Interview by John Luter with Orval Faubus (Aug. 18, 1971).
21. BLOSSoM, supra note 10, at 53.
UALR LAW REVIEW
integration, would the judge uphold that injunction when it was brought into
federal court? With a surprising disregard for judicial ethics, the judge rep-
lied that he would.22
Upton returned to Little Rock and reported this exchange to Blossom,
who immediately requested and received permission for them to visit the
governor at the Mansion. The two schoolmen told Faubus of Upton's con-
versation with Judge Miller, and they asked the governor to find a plaintiff
who would bring suit in state court for an injunction against the Little Rock
School Board.23 Faubus replied with incredulity, something along the lines
of "Now let me get this straight, Virgil. You want me to find a plaintiff to
bring a suit against your School Board to stop the integration plan that you
volunteered to develop and that you have gone all over town for two years
trying to sell? '24 After a bit of cajoling, the governor agreed to Blossom's
new plan, ultimately finding Mrs. Clyde Thomason to file suit against the
Little Rock School Board.25
Mary Thomason was the secretary of the newly formed Mothers'
League of Central High School, an arm of the Capital Citizens' Council.
Observers have assumed from that day to this that the Thomason suit was a
creature of the Citizens' Council and that Faubus was acting in concert with
that segregationist organization. Actually, the Citizens' Council was not
involved with the Thomason suit. Instead, Virgil Blossom and Wayne Upton
were the architects of the suit against their own plan.
Little Rock School Board attorney Archie House had no knowledge of
the meeting with Judge Miller until Faubus biographer Roy Reed told him
about it thirty years later.26 It is not clear from surviving evidence whether
the full School Board knew of the scheme. It is known, however, that Blos-
som, Upton, and School Board member Harold Engstrom paid a second visit
to Judge Miller, at which time the judge advised the three men on the specif-
ics of how to craft their case.27 On August 28, 1957, the Thursday before
school was to start on the following Tuesday, the secret plan went into ef-
fect.
At Blossom's urging, Governor Faubus agreed to testify in the Thoma-
son suit.28 He had called the Justice Department three times asking for help
22. Interview by FBI with Wayne Upton (Sept. 7, 1957), FBI REPORT.
23. Id. Faubus interview, supra note 20, at 9-10, EAP; see also FAUBUS, supra note 17,
at 201 (providing Faubus's description of the meeting).
24. Interview by Roy Reed with Orval Faubus and Bill Smith (Dec. 18, 1989), at 37.
25. Interview by FBI with Arthur Frankel (Sept. 7, 1957), FBI REPORT.
26. Interview by Roy Reed with Archie House (July 28, 1990), at 14, Reed Papers.
27. Interview by Roy Reed with Harold Engstrom (Jan. 11, 1990), at 7, Reed Papers.
28. Interview by John Pagan with Forrest Rozzell (Dec. 29, 1972), at 10, (on file with
the author). The author is indebted to John Pagan for sharing this interview with her. See also
Faubus interview, supra note 20.
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in the potentially dangerous situation in Little Rock, but the federal govern-
ment had declined to get involved. 9 Faubus believed this was sheer cowar-
dice. He resented bitterly that a Republican administration expected south-
ern Democratic officials to implement a dreaded cultural change that the
Republicans had crafted but that they now refused to shed their own politi-
cal blood to enforce.30
When the Arkansas governor walked into the packed courtroom in
downtown Little Rock, Virgil Blossom was on the stand. Archie House
asked the superintendent if he feared an outbreak of violence when school
started the next week, and to Orval Faubus's complete astonishment, he
heard Blossom reply, "I've never given it a thought."'', Thinking this must
be a change of strategy that would be explained to him later, Faubus testi-
fied as planned that he had extensive evidence of the danger of violence if
the schools opened integrated the following week.3' He did not say that most
of his information came from Blossom. As expected, based on the gover-
nor's testimony the state judge issued an injunction against the Little Rock
School Board, barring it from proceeding with its planned desegregation.33
An indignant Archie House went immediately to the federal courthouse
and requested an audience with the federal judge, intending to file suit for an
injunction against the enforcement of the state court's action. There he
learned that Judge John Miller had just removed himself from the case. Two
days later an article in the Arkansas Gazette announced that Judge Miller
was the leading candidate for a seat on the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.34 Clearly Judge Miller did not want to shed any of his political blood
in the developing situation in Little Rock. Visiting judge Ronald Davies, a
young and inexperienced jurist from North Dakota, heard Archie House's
plea, and on Friday August 29, 1957, he issued an injunction that in effect
overruled the state court's injunction against the School Board.3 5
29. FAUBUS, supra note 17, at 197.
30. Id. at 197-98.
31. Id. at 201-02. Blossom's answer came in response to his attorney's question about
the danger of importing large numbers of black children into the formerly white schools.
Blossom elaborated that he had not "given it a thought" because he knew he was not going to
import a large number of black students. See Transcript of Testimony, Thomason v. Cooper,
254 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1958).
32. FAUBUS, supra note 17, at 202; see also Faubus interview, supra note 20, at 13.
33. Arthur Caldwell to Warren Olney III, August 30, 1957, Box 5, Folder 2, Caldwell
Papers.
34. On August 31, 1957, the Arkansas Gazette reported, "The Senate approved unanim-
ously a bill by Senator John L. McClellan (Dem., Ark.) to add an additional judge to the
eighth circuit court of appeals .... Reliable sources say it would go to federal District Judge
John E. Miller of Fort Smith .... "East Arkansas Federal Judgeship Still Wide Open, ARK.
GAZETTE, Aug. 31, 1957, at 1A.
35. State Injunction Voided, RACE RELATIONS LAW REPORTER 935-36 (Vol. II, Oct.
1957).
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Orval Faubus now found himself facing a delicate situation he had
hoped-and schemed-to avoid. After a late-night conversation with Virgil
Blossom, Fabus concluded that the School Board had used him for its pur-
poses but had no intention of assuming any of the political risk associated
with their collective actions. 6 The federal judge had failed him. The Justice
Department had failed him. He felt betrayed and alone. The responsibility
for maintaining the peace in a dangerous situation was clearly his, and yet
he believed that if he used his power to help implement desegregation he
would commit political suicide.37 He also knew, however, that if he at-
tempted to block the planned integration at Central High, he would be found
in defiance of court orders. He spent a sleepless weekend trying to visualize
and plan a safe course of action.
Faubus had contemplated the possibility of using the National Guard at
Central High School all through the summer, and he had discussed that op-
tion with various advisers.38 On Saturday morning he discussed it with his
cabinet officers, and all but one agreed that if he feared violence at the high
school he should use the Guard to prevent it.39 He placed the Guard on alert
status. The State Police also conducted interviews around town and brought
Faubus disturbing reports of impending danger. Some of his most troubling
information came in a series of telephone calls that Jim Johnson orchestrated
that weekend: threats that bands of armed men were heading for Little Rock
in caravans from eastern Arkansas.4 ° In addition, Faubus associate Jimmy
Karam moved into the Governor's Mansion over the weekend (along with
several other key advisers) where they made it their business to screen the
governor's telephone calls, allowing Faubus to talk only to passionate se-
gregationists. Orval Faubus felt under siege.
On Monday morning, September 2, 1957, which was Labor Day, Gov-
ernor Faubus told his attorney and principal adviser that he had decided to
use the National Guard at Central High School to "keep the peace." Bill
Smith advised against that course of action, warning the governor that his
36. FAUBUS, supra note 17, at 202. Faubus told this interviewer that Blossom said, "Oh,
I want to thank you, I want to thank you, and I want to tell you that anything I can ever do for
you in the future or otherwise, you just have to call on me." Interview with Orval Faubus
(May 12, 1994).
37. Interview by Reed with Faubus, supra note 24, at 15.
38. Interview with Wayne Glenn (Jan. 13, 2004) (on file with the author).
39. Interview by FBI with Combs, FBI REPORT; interview by Roy Reed with Claude
Carpenter, (Aug. 1, 1990); interview with Claude Carpenter (Nov. 13, 2001) (copy in posses-
sion of the author).
40. Interview with Jim Johnson (Apr. 23, 2002) (on file with the author). See also REED,
supra note 17, at 192-93.
41. Interview by John Luter with James T. Karam (Aug. 20, 1971).
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political enemies would accuse him of manufacturing a crisis.42 Undeterred
Faubus went on statewide television at 10:00 that night to announce that
units of the Arkansas National Guard had surrounded Central High School
with the goal of preserving domestic tranquility, and that for the moment,
the schools should operate "as they have in the past," or in other words, se-
gregated. 3
The School Board at once advised the nine black children who were
still planning to attempt desegregation the next day (seventeen had been
approved) that they should stay home while school officials asked the feder-
al judge for direction." Virgil Blossom had met with the seventeen on Sun-
day afternoon, and he had persuaded eight of them to return to the black
high school until the overheated situation in Little Rock cooled.4 ' At the
same time, the local United States Attorney had met with the lawyer for the
NAACP, Wiley Branton, urging him to send all of the African American
children back to the black high school until the impending crisis dissipated.46
When the School Board went before Judge Davies on the evening of
September 3, 1957, asking for a delay, the judge commented he was taking
the governor at his word that the Guardsmen were acting neither as segrega-
tionists nor as integrationists, and he ordered them to proceed with desegre-
gation.47 Virgil Blossom called NAACP state president Daisy Bates and told
her to have the children at Central High the next morning. Mrs. Bates con-
tacted all of The Nine except Elizabeth Eckford (whom Mrs. Bates sug-
gested did not have a telephone), and the next day Elizabeth walked alone at
Central High.4 ' The disturbing photographs of her ordeal flashed across the
globe, causing Little Rock to become a major liability in the nation's Cold
42. Interview by Reed with Faubus and Smith, supra note 24; Faubus interview supra
note 20.
43. Ray Moseley, Troops Take Over At Central High, ARK. GAZETTE, Sept. 3, 1957, at
2A. For the full text of the Faubus speech, see "First Speech," Sept. 2, 1957, Box 496, Folder
1, Orval E. Faubus Papers, Special Collections, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.
44. Mosely, supra note 43; interview by FBI with Edwin L. Hawkins, (Sept. 6, 1957),
FBI REPORT.
45. Daisy Bates to Roy Wilkins, August 24, 1959, Microfilm Series, Part 3, Series D,
Reel 2, Folder: "Desegregation Schools Arkansas Little Rock, Central High, 1959," Papers of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Library of Congress,
Washington, D. C.; see also Daisy Bates to Wiley Branton, August 26, 1959, Box 2, Folder
1, Daisy Bates Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin.
46. As Branton told the EAP: "the Justice Department lawyers went to great lengths to
try and get me to persuade my clients to withdraw and go back to the segregated schools and
allow for a cooling-off period, before proceeding further." Interview by Steven Lawson with
Wiley A. Branton, Sr. (Oct. 21, 1970).
47. RACE RELATIONS LAW REPORTER, supra note 35, at 958.
48. DAIsY BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF LITTLE ROCK 66 (1962).
UALR LAW REVIEW
War effort to win the hearts and minds of people of color around the
world.49
United States Attorney General Herbert Brownell concluded imme-
diately that Orval Faubus was attempting to precipitate the "clash of historic
importance" he had expected to develop somewhere in the South, and his
Justice Department initiated an effort to crush the expression of Massive
Resistance Brownell thought he was seeing. Much more was at stake than
the political needs of a small-state governor or even the well being of a
small southern community. Brownell believed he was fighting in defense of
democracy everywhere, and he undoubtedly cast an eye as well on the swel-
ling voter base among African Americans in the northern cities. Now that
Little Rock had become an international incident, its perceived spirit of de-
fiance could not be tolerated.
Harry Ashmore overreached when he described the Little Rock situa-
tion as "The Crisis Mr. Faubus Made." It was instead a crisis that Orval
Faubus backed into, reluctantly, when all the avenues for escape had been
closed-by the aggressive actions of the segregationists, by the manipula-
tions of a frightened School Board, by the early reluctance of the Justice
Department to get involved, and by the calculation and ambition of a waver-
ing federal judge. Ultimately, Herbert Brownell, President Eisenhower, and
even Harry Ashmore played important roles in a process of isolating Orval
Faubus, a process that caused him to harden, to yield to his own opportun-
ism, and to land as a consequence on the wrong side of history.
49. See MARY DUDziAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2000).
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